Security policies for distributed systems by Quilbeuf, Jean et al.
ar
X
iv
:1
31
0.
37
23
v1
  [
cs
.C
R]
  1
4 O
ct 
20
13
Security policies for distributed systems∗
Jean Quilbeuf Georgeta Igna Denis Bytschkow
Harald Ruess
fortiss
An-Institut Technische Universita¨t Mu¨nchen
Guerickestr. 25, 80805 Mu¨nchen, Germany
{quilbeuf,igna,bytschkow,ruess}@fortiss.org
Abstract
A security policy specifies a security property as the maximal informa-
tion flow. A distributed system composed of interacting processes implic-
itly defines an intransitive security policy by repudiating direct informa-
tion flow between processes that do not exchange messages directly. We
show that implicitly defined security policies in distributed systems are
enforced, provided that processes run in separation, and possible process
communication on a technical platform is restricted to specified message
paths of the system. Furthermore, we propose to further restrict the al-
lowable information flow by adding filter functions for controlling which
messages may be transmitted between processes, and we prove that locally
checking filter functions is sufficient for ensuring global security policies.
Altogether, global intransitive security policies are established by means of
local verification conditions for the (trusted) processes of the distributed
system. Moreover, security policies may be implemented securely on dis-
tributed integration platforms which ensure partitioning. We illustrate
our results with a smart grid case study, where we use CTL model check-
ing for discharging local verification conditions for each process under
consideration.
1 Introduction
Modern applications are often implemented in terms of distributed systems con-
sisting of interacting components. Depending on the requirements of the appli-
cation, some components possess/know sensitive data or assets that must not
be disclosed to a certain subset of the other components. Consider, for example,
∗This work was carried out as part of the DMILS project www.d-mils.org which is funded
by the European Commission under the contract Nr. FP7-ICT-3187727 of the 7th Framework
Programme for Information and Communications Technology. The smart grid case study
has been supported by the Smart Energy Systems action line of the EIT ICT Labs and the
Bavarian Ministry of Economics.
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a voting system with a central unit for counting votes and voters. The central
unit needs to get hold of any particular vote for counting, but it must not leak
particular votes to other voters.
Such a security propertymay be expressed in terms of a security policy, which
decomposes a system into various security domains (e.g. users or processes) with
consistent levels of information [8]. A security policy defines a maximal bound on
the allowable information being transmitted between different security domains.
In this way, a security policy specifies how information is allowed to flow between
different security domains, and, for every possible run of the system, security
domains must not gather more information than what is allowed by the security
policy.
More concretely, we are considering distributed systems consisting of pro-
cesses communicating through asynchronous message passing. Such a distributed
system implicitly determines a security policy by considering the processes of
this system as security domains. Whenever two processes exchange messages,
this implicit security policy allows information to flow from the sender of the
message to its receivers. This implicitly defined security policy is intransitive,
since information may not necessarily flow directly from process π1 to process
π3 whenever it flows directly from π1 to π2 and from π2 to π3. In these cases,
the transmission of information from π1 to π3 requires transmission via π2.
Intransitive security policies have previously been studied by Rushby [15]
and van der Meyden [13]. One of the main underlying assumptions of their
framework is that any action can always be taken in any global state. Consider,
for example, an action a that transmits information from π1 to π2, an action
b that transmits information from π2 to π3, and assume that b forwards the
information about π1 that π2 has gathered. Action b can be executed before
or after π1 executed the action a, which yields different states in π3, depending
on the state of π2. In order to capture this situation, Rushby [15] and van der
Meyden [13] define the information available to a security domain in a recur-
sive manner. In our example, the information available in π3 after executing b
contains the information available in π2 before executing b.
In contrast to Rushby [15] and van der Meyden [13] we are working in an
asynchronous setting with actions for emitting and receiving messages. A system
simply defines a set of possible execution traces (e.g. Mantel [12], Balliu [2]).
Furthermore, we assume that messages contain all the information, that is,
the information detained by a process is the complete history of received and
sent messages. Therefore, in contrast to Rushby [15] and van der Meyden [13]
, sending the message b from the domain π2 is possible only if π2 has already
received message a. When π3 receives b, it may infer, knowing the set of possible
executions, that a has been transmitted. We consider such as system to be
secure, as the information was relayed by π2. Such a system is considered to be
insecure, however, whenever π3 may observe directly the emission of a.
The notion of implicit security policy for distributed systems as outlined
above needs to be strengthened. Consider, for example, a voting system, where
each voter receives the result of the vote from the central unit once the election
is done. Since each voter sent his vote before the results are published, the
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implicit security policy allows the resulting message to contain the detail of
the votes. Therefore, the implicit security policy does not ensure that no voter
may know the vote of another voter. Chong and van der Meyden [5] introduce
filter functions to strengthen a given security policy. A filter function restricts
the information between two security domains, depending to the history of the
actions executed. For instance, the filter function between the central unit and
a voter might allow transmission of information only if (1) all voters have voted
and (2) the data sent back are only the election results. The filter function of
Chong and van der Meyden [5] replace actions, whereas Zhang [16] considers
Boolean filter functions for allowing or disallowing information to flow.
We consider Boolean filter functions as in Zhang [16], and we require that
a filter function depends only on the local history of the domain that can issue
the information. For instance, for the voting system example, the filter function
depends only on the messages received and sent by the central unit. A filter
function restricts the outputs of one particular process. Checking that the
behavior of this particular process respects the filter functions, that is does not
send messages it is not allowed to send, can be done separately. We show that
it is sufficient to check that every filter function is respected to prove that the
security policy is met. Components whose output is not restricted by a filter
function do not need to be checked. In the voting system example, we do not
need to check the behavior of each voter, it is sufficient to check the central
unit.
Our approach is illustrated by means of prosumer-based smart micro grid.
The smart micro grid negotiates with a set of prosumers — that is, agents which
may either produce or consume energy — in order to assure the stability of the
smart grid. We encode this prosumer-based smart grid as a distributed system
and the main security property, that no prosumer should be able to deduce
the consumption or production of any other prosumer, is encoded by means
of an intransitive security policy using Boolean filter functions. We use model
checking techniques on the trusted security domain to prove that the smart
micro grid respects the specified filter function.
Security policies may be enforced by means of time, space, and I/O partition-
ing. Separation kernels [14] enable processes to share ressources (e.g. comput-
ing, memory) without introducing unwanted and hidden communication chan-
nels. In a similar way, time-triggered networks [10] provide time partitioning
and ensure isolation of communication channels. A distributed, mixed-criticality
platform combining these two approaches is currently being developed in the
D-MILS project with the explicit goal of implementing and enforcing security
policies on a distributed platform. In this way, security policies can be imple-
mented on a distributed computing platform.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we define our model of
distributed systems, that we call distributed machine and the notion of security
policy. In Section 3, we show that a distributed system complies with its implicit
security policy and that local check of filter function is sufficient to ensure that
the global system meets a filtered security policy. Our smart micro grid case
study is detailed in Section 4. Finally, we present related work in Section 5 and
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conclude with Section 6.
2 Information Flow
The information flow of a system is the information exchanged between different
security domains of a system. A security policy defines a maximal information
flow. A system complies with a security policy if no part of the system can
obtain more information than allowed by the maximal information flow.
Following the work by Chong and van der Meyden [5], we model a system
using the notion of machine, and the maximum information flow as a security
policy that are formally defined in the next sections. We formally state the fact
that a machine complies with a security policy.
2.1 Distributed Machine
In this paper, we focus on distributed systems made of independent processes
exchanging messages. Our definition of distributed machine has been inspired
by the machine model introduced by Rushby [15] and van der Meyden [13]. We
start by formally defining processes and then explain how to compose them.
Definition 1. A process is a tuple π = (S, s0, Ain , Aout , step), where
• S is a set of states, with s0 as the initial state,
• A = Ain ∪ Aout is the set of actions composed of receive actions Ain and
send actions Aout , and,
• step : S ×A → S is a partial transition function. We write step(s, a) =
undef when the action a cannot be executed from state s.
We distinguish between two types of actions in a process. A send action,
denoted !m models the emission of the message m. A receive action, denoted
?pim models the reception of the message m in the process π. The set of states
and the set of actions may be infinite.
Not all actions are possible from every state. We denote by LocalExec(π)
the sequence of actions that are valid executions of π. For a sequence δ ∈
LocalExec(π), we denote by s0.δ the state reached after executing the sequence
δ. We denote by ǫ the empty sequence.
Example 1. In Figure 1, we represent a process, that operates as a switch for
sending commands either to a high or a low security network. This example
shows a simplified version of the switch component from the Starlight Interactive
Link [1]. In [5], the Starlight system is taken as an example to illustrate filter
functions. This process may receive 3 types of messages, namely res, cmd and
toggle. The reception of a toggle message (from the user) switches the security
mode between high (state h) and low (state l). Whenever a cmd (command)
message is received (from the user), it is forwarded to a network for execution.
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Figure 1: Graphical representation of a process.
If the process is in high security mode, the command is sent to the high secu-
rity network through a cmdH message, otherwise it is sent to the low security
network through a cmdL message. Whenever a res (result) message is received,
it is forwarded to the user through a display message.
Formally, the set of states is {h, hr, hc, ℓ, ℓr, ℓc}. The set of input actions is
{?Scmd, ?
S
toggle, ?
S
res} and the set of output actions is {!cmdL, !cmdH, !display}. The
step function is defined as shown on the figure, for instance step(h, ?Stoggle) = ℓ
and step(hr, ?Stoggle) = undef .
In this paper, we consider distributed machines that are defined as the com-
position of a set of processes. The processes communicate through asynchronous
message passing. An action of the distributed machine is either the emission
or the reception of a message. As the synchronous reception of the message
might not be possible in every state of a process, we assume that each process
is equipped with a buffer for storing incoming messages. The consumption of
a message in the buffer corresponds to a receive action. Identifying the sender
of an action allows mapping this action to a security domain which is needed
to reason about information flow. Therefore, we require that, for each message
defined in the set of processes, there is a unique sender.
Definition 2 (Process composability). Given a set of processes {π1, . . . , πn},
where for each i, πi = (Si, s
0
i , A
in
i , A
out
i , stepi), we say that they are composable
iff for each message m, there exists a unique process πi such that !m ∈ A
out
i and
at least one process πj such that ?
pij
a ∈ Ainj . We call process πi the sender of m
and πj a receiver of m.
The behavior of a distributed machine is as follows. Sending a message !m is
done by executing the transition labeled by !m in the sender and addingm in the
buffer of each receiver ofm. Receiving a message ?piim in πi is done by removing an
occurrence ofm from the buffer of πi and executing the corresponding transition
locally. The buffer is represented by a sequence of input actions. If several
receive actions are possible, only the one corresponding to the message occurring
first in the buffer can be executed.
A machine as defined in [13] is a transition system, extended with a de-
composition into security domains. Each of these security domains delimits a
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subpart of the system that is granted a given level of information. The defini-
tion of a machine contains an observation function stating what each domain
can observe from the global state. In a distributed machine, each process cor-
responds to a security domain, which can only observe its local state and the
buffer of incoming messages.
Definition 3. Given a set of processes {π1, . . . , πn} that are composable, a
distributed machine is a tuple M = (S, s0, A, step, D, dom, obs), such that
• S = (S1 × A
in
1
∗
) × . . . × (Sn × A
in
n
∗
), and s0 = ((s01, ǫ), . . . , (s
0
n, ǫ)). We
denote by (q1, . . . , qn) a global state of the system, where for each i, qi =
(si, βi) indicates the current state si of the process πi and the contents βi
of the input buffer.
• A =
n⋃
i=1
(
Aini ∪ A
out
i
)
The actions of the distributed machine are emissions
and receptions of messages.
• step contains two types of transitions, that correspond to sending and
receiving messages:
– if for a process πi there exists !m ∈ A
out
i such that stepi(si, !m) 6=
undef then step((q1, . . . , qn), !m) = (q
′
1, . . . , q
′
n) where
q′j = (s
′
j , β
′
j) =


(stepj(sj , !m), βj) if i = j∧?
pij
m /∈ Ainj
(sj , βj.m) if ?
pij
m ∈ Ainj ∧ i 6= j
(stepj(sj , !m), βj .m) if i = j∧?
pij
m ∈ Ainj
(sj , βj) otherwise
– if for a process πi, there exists ?
pii
m ∈ A
in
i such that
stepi(si, ?
pii
m ) 6= undef ∧βi = α1.m.α2∧∀b ∈ α1 stepi(si, ?
pii
b ) = undef
then
step((q1, . . . , (si, βi), . . . , qn), ?
pii
m ) = (q1, . . . , (stepi(si, ?
pii
m ), α1.α2), . . . , qn)
• D = {π1, . . . , πn},
• dom : A → D such that dom(!m) = dom(?
pij
m ) = πi where πi is the only
process such that !m ∈ A
out
i ,
• obs : D × S →
n⋃
i=1
(Si ×A
in
i ), defined by obs(πi, (q1, . . . , qi, . . . , qn)) = qi.
As for processes, a distributed machine cannot execute any action from any
state. We denote by Exec(M) the valid executions of a distributed machine.
For a sequence α ∈ Exec(M), we denote by s0.α the global state reached after
executing α.
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Figure 2: A distributed machine obtained by composing the processes
{H,L, S, U}. Each arrow corresponds to a message that can be exchanged
between two processes.
Example 2. Figure 2 represents a global view of the Starlight Interactive Link.
There are four processes: a high-security network H , a low-security network L,
the switch S detailed in Figure 1 and a user U . The user toggles between
high-security and low-security mode by sending a toggle message. The user
inputs commands (cmd) to the switch, which forwards them to the high- or
low-security network, depending on the current mode. Upon reception of a
command, the H or L process executes it and outputs the result (resL and res
messages respectively). The result of a command executed in the low-security
network is transmitted back to the switch through the high-security network.
Upon reception of a result, the switch forwards it to the user through a display
message.
We do not detail the behavior of each component. The beginning of a valid
execution of the system is !cmd !toggle ?
S
cmd !cmdH ?
S
toggle. Actions ?
S
cmd, ?
S
toggle
and !cmdH correspond to the transitions of process S as depicted in Figure 1.
Each process is a security domain. Each action that is sending or receiving
a message is associated to the domain corresponding to the sender process. For
instance, dom(!cmdL) = dom(?
L
cmdL) = S. Each process can observe its local state
and its input buffer. For instance, in the global state s.!cmd!toggle reached after
executing !cmd!toggle, we have obs(S, s) = (h, cmd toggle).
In this example, the security property to ensure is “The low security network
has no information about the commands sent to the high security network”.
2.2 Security policy
A security policy is represented as a directed graph, whose vertices are the
security domains and edges may be labeled by filter functions. Intuitively, an
edge between two security domains allows information to flow according to the
direction of the edge. An example of security policy is depicted in Figure 3
which presents how information flows in the machine depicted in Figure 2.
In our model, transmission of information is expressed through actions, that
modify the state of different processes. The presence of an edge between two
security domains indicates that any action whose domain is the source of the
edge may transmit information to the destination of the edge. According to
Figure 3, an action executed in process S might affect both the state of H ,
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Figure 3: Security policy with the domains of the machine from Figure 2.
L and U . An edge labeled by a filter function may allow or not an action at
the source to affect the state of the destination, depending on the sequence of
actions executed so far. In the figure, the edge between S and L is labeled by
a filter function f . The intuitive role of f is to ensure that L receives only
commands sent in low security mode by the user.
Definition 4. Given a set of actions A, a filter function f : A∗ → {True, False}
returns a boolean indicating whether the last action of the sequence can be
transmitted.
We denote by F(A) the set of filter functions defined on the set of actions A.
In our example, the function f is true only when both:
• the last action is !cmdL, and
• the number of toggle messages received is odd, indicating that the user is
inputting commands in low security mode. (We assume that the system
starts in high security mode.)
Formally, we write f(αa) = (a =!cmdL) ∧ (|α|?
toggle
mod 2 = 1), where |α|a is
the number of occurrences of a in the sequence α.
Definition 5. A security policy A defined over the set of actions A is a pair
(D, ) where
• D is a set of security domains and
•  ⊆ D × F(A) ∪ {⊤} ×D is a set of edges, labeled by filter functions in
F or ⊤. We require that:
– ∀πi ∈ D.(πi,⊤, πi) ∈ .
– if (πi, f, πj) ∈ , then f is in F(A
in
i ∪ A
out
i ).
The first restriction on the definition of  states that each security domain
can always observe actions that are associated to itself. The second restriction
states that a filter function applied to the flow between a process πi and πj
should depend only on the sequence of messages received and sent by πi. It can
be extended to a function depending on all actions executed on the system by
simply discarding actions that are not in Aini ∪ A
out
i .
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We write πi
f
 πj if (πi, f, πj) ∈ . An edge labeled by ⊤ imposes no
restriction on the corresponding information flow. In that case, we denote πi  
πj . A security policy is transitive if it contains only edges labeled by ⊤ and the
relation  is transitive. Otherwise, it is intransitive. We focus on intransitive
policies, such as the one depicted in Figure 3.
There are several constructions for representing the maximal information
allowed by a security policy [5], yielding different notions of security. Contrarily
to the model described in [5], we do not assume that any action is possible
from any state. Consequently, each process knows the set of possible global
executions and may infer some informations about the global state, based on its
observation. In our example, when the low security network receives a command
to execute, it knows that this command was sent before by the user to the switch.
Such information may be computed by using knowledge with perfect recall as
in [2].
The information available to a security domain after executing a given se-
quence of actions is obtained by purging actions not visible by the security
domain. An information is not visible by a security domain if either there is no
incoming arrow from the domain of the action or if the incoming arrow is labeled
by a filter function that evaluates to false. Formally, we recursively define the
purge function for a security domain π as purgepi(ǫ) = ǫ and
purgepi(αa) =
{
purgepi(α) if dom(a) 6 π ∨ (dom(a)
f
 π ∧ ¬f(αa))
purgepi(α)a otherwise
The purged execution sequence represents the maximal information that a
process is allowed to have at a given execution point. A distributed machine
complies with a security policy if for each security domain, the observation after
executing a sequence α depends only on the purged sequence.
Definition 6. A distributed machine M = (S, s0, A, step, D, dom, obs) com-
plies with the security policy A = (D, ) if:
∀πi ∈ D, ∀α, β ∈ Exec(M),
purgepii(α) = purgepii(β) =⇒ obspii(s
0.α) = obspii(s
0.β)
Finally, we remark that a distributed machine implicitly defines a security
policy without filter functions. The security domains are already defined by
assigning a domain to each process. If a message can be sent from a process π1
to a process π2, there is an arrow from the security domain π1 to the security
domain π2.
Definition 7. The implicit security policy defined by a distributed machineM
obtained by composing the processes {π1, . . . , πn} is the pair (D, ) where:
• D = {π1, . . . , πn} each process is a security domain,
• !m ∈ A
out
i ∧?
pij
m ∈ Ainj =⇒ (πi,⊤, πj) ∈ . If a message m can be
sent from πi to πj , there is an arrow between the corresponding security
domains.
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3 Proving Security Policies for Distributed Ma-
chines
We use the method based on unwinding relations [9] to prove that a machine
complies with a given security policy. An unwinding relation assigns to each
security domain π an equivalence relation on the states of the machine that we
denote by ∼pi.
We first consider the case where all edges of the security policy are labeled by
⊤, that is without filter functions. In that case, the Theorem 1 by Rushby [15]
states that a machineM complies with a security policy if there exists a family
of unwinding relations {∼pi}pi∈D such that, for any two states s, t ∈ S, any
process π ∈ D and any action a ∈ A, we have:
• Output consistency. If s ∼pi t, then obs(π, s) = obs(π, t).
• Step consistency. If s ∼pi t then ∀a ∈ A, step(s, a) ∼pi step(t, a).
• Local respect. If dom(a) 6 π, then s ∼pi step(s, a).
Note that we actually use the formulation by van der Meyden [13]. Using
unwinding relations, we prove that a distributed machine complies with its
implicit security policy described in Definition 7.
Proposition 1. A distributed machine complies with its implicit security policy.
The proof relies on the fact that the current state of a process depends only
on the messages it receives and sends. The implicit security policy allows each
process to observe these actions. Therefore the distributed machine complies
with the implicit security policy.
Proof. We consider the unwinding relations obtained as follows: Given two
states q = (q1, . . . , qn) and r = (r1, . . . , rn), we define q ∼pii r iff qi = ri. This
is clearly an equivalence relation. Recall that for each i, qi = (si, βi) where si
is the state of the process and βi the input buffer. We now prove the three
properties needed to establish security:
• Output consistency q ∼pi r =⇒ qi = ri =⇒ obs(πi, q) = obs(πi, r).
• Step consistency Let a ∈ A be an action, q, r ∈ S be two global states and
q′ = step(q, a), r′ = step(r, a) the states reached when executing a. We
assume that q ∼pi r, that is qi = ri. Recall that a is either the emission of
a message !m or the reception of a message ?
pii
m .
If πi is not sender nor receiver of the message m, by definition of step, we
have q′i = qi and r
′
i = ri. Since qi = ri, we have q
′ ∼pii r
′.
If a =!m is the emission of the message m:
– if πi is the sender of the message, by definition of step, q
′
i = (stepi(si,m), βi)
and r′i = (stepi(ti,m), γi). Since (si, βi) = qi = ri = (ti, γi), we have
q′i = r
′
i that is q
′ ∼pii r
′.
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– if πi is a receiver of the message, by definition of step, q
′
i = (si, βim)
and r′i = (ti, γim). Since (si, βi) = qi = ri = (ti, γi), we have q
′
i = r
′
i
that is q′ ∼pii r
′.
If a =?
pij
m is the reception of the message m:
– if πi is the sender of the message, by definition of step, q
′
i = qi and
r′i = ri, that is q
′ ∼pii r
′.
– if πi is the receiver of the message, by definition of step, q
′
i =
(stepi(si), α1α2) and r
′
i = (stepi(ti), α
′
1α
′
2), where (si, α1mα2) =
qi = ri = (ti, α
′
1mα
′
2). Since m does not appear in α1 or α
′
1, we have
q′i = r
′
i that is q
′ ∼pii r
′.
• Local respect Let a ∈ A be an action, q ∈ S be a state, and q′ = step(q, a).
By definition of , dom(a) 6 πi only if dom(a) does not send any message
to π. By definition of step, if a is the emission or the reception of a
message not involving πi, then q
′
i = qi. Thus q ∼pii step(q, a).
We extend the unwinding theorem to security policies with filter functions.
We define an additional property, that depends only on the local state of the
component. This property ensures that the transmission of a message from a
process πi to a process πj cannot take place whenever the filter function on the
edge between security domains πi and πj evaluates to false. The transmission
of the message cannot take place if either πj is not a receiver of the message or
the send action is not possible in πi.
• Local Filter Respect : ∀(πi, f, πj) ∈ ∀δ ∈ LocalExec(πi)
¬f(δa) =⇒ a /∈ Ainj ∨ step(s
0
i .δ, a) = undef
Theorem 1 states that a distributed machine complies with a security policy
provided that there exists an unwinding relation that respects output consis-
tency, step consistency, local respect and that local filter respect is also verified.
Theorem 1. Let M be a machine, A be a security policy, and for each domain
π ∼pi be an equivalence relation. If the relations {∼pi}pi∈D verify output consis-
tency, step consistency, local respect and local filter respect properties, then the
machine M complies with the architecture A.
Proof. Let α, β ∈ Exec(M) be two executions ofM. We prove by induction on
|α|+ |β| that purgepi(α) = purgepi(β) =⇒ s
0.α ∼pi s
0.β.
The base case is β = α = ǫ, and we have s0 ∼pi s
0.
Let us write α = α′a. We distinguish between the two following cases:
• dom(a) 6 π or dom(a)
f
 π and f(α) is false. In that case, purgepi(αa) =
purgepi(α) = purgepi(β). By applying the induction hypothesis on α
′ and
β, we obtain s0.α′ ∼pi s
0.β. Since α′a is a valid execution sequence, the
local respect ensures that a is not an action that can be received by π.
Thus s0.α′ ∼pi step(s
0.α′, a) and we conclude s0.α ∼pi s
0.β.
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• dom(a)  π or dom(a)
f
 π and f(α) is true. In that case, we can as-
sume that β also ends with a. Otherwise, by swapping α and β, one falls
back in the previous case. We write β = β′a. By definition of the purge
function we have purgepi(α) = purgepi(α
′)a and similarly purgepi(β) =
purgepi(β
′)a and therefore purgepi(α
′) = purgepi(β
′). The induction hy-
pothesis applied to α′ and β′ gives us s0.α′ ∼pi s
0.β′. The step consistency
allows us to conclude s0.α ∼pi s
0.β.
We proved that purgepi(α) = purgepi(β) =⇒ s
0.α ∼pi s
0.β. By using the
output consistency, we have s0.α ∼pi s
0.β =⇒ obspi(s
0.α) = obspi(s
0.β), which
concludes the proof.
We already exhibited unwinding relations for the particular case of dis-
tributed systems, that prove compliance of a distributed machine with its im-
plicit security policy. In particular, a security policy obtained by labeling some
edges of the implicit security policy with filter functions can be ensure by check-
ing the local filter respect. As the latter property involves only the actions of
one process, it can be checked locally on that process.
Example 3. Consider again the Starlight example. The security policy de-
picted in Figure 3 is obtained from the implicit security policy of the starlight
example, with a additional filter function on the edge between S and L. It is
sufficient to check that S respects the filter function f to ensure that the system
complies with the security policy from Figure 3.
4 Case Study
The case study discussed in this paper is a simplified version of the smart micro-
grid system that is implemented in our research lab [11]. The system contains a
smart micro grid (SMG) that coordinates a finite set of prosumers Pr1 , . . . ,Prn .
Each prosumer can produce energy and consume energy from the local produc-
tion and from the grid. Moreover, each prosumer has the possibility to store
energy in batteries. Therefore, a prosumer may sell energy or buy energy from
the grid.
SMG
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(price)
E
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Figure 4: A machine of the smart microgrid system
Figure 4 shows a high-level view of the machine of our case study. The
SMG generates a price for energy and transfers it to the prosumers through
action P(price). The price is the same for both buying and selling energy to
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the grid. Based on the price received and an estimation of the local production
and consumption, each prosumer computes a production plan (variable prodi in
the figure). This plan specifies the amount of energy the prosumer buys or sells
from/to the grid. If this value is positive, then the prosumer produces more en-
ergy than its local needs which is sold to the grid, otherwise, it buys energy from
the grid. The production plans are sent through the Plan action to the SMG .
When all prosumers have sent their production plans, the SMG computes the
global production of the grid. The global production may be negative, in which
case the prosumers consume more energy than what they globally produce.
The stability of the grid is assured if the global production does not exceed
the available line capacity that is specified by an upper and a lower bound i.e.
UB , and LB respectively. Variable excess returns the amount by which the
global production exceeds the bounds of the line capacity. If the global produc-
tion is within the bounds, the grid will be stable and the excess variable has the
value zero. Otherwise, it returns the amount by which the global production
exceeds the bounds. If action E (excess) transfers a nonzero value, all prosumers
have to adjust their plans. After that, new plans are sent back to the SMG ,
which updates the excess and sends it to the prosumers. It may take more
rounds to have the plans accepted by the SMG . Once the plans are validated,
we assume that they become active for a finite period of time, after which a new
price is generated and new plans are computed.
SMG
Pr1 f
ex
ce
ss
. . . Prn
f
ex
cess
Figure 5: Security policy of the system
The security property that the smart microgrid system should ensure is that
none of the prosumers can guess the plan of any other prosumer. Otherwise, a
prosumer could change its own plan according to other prosumer plans and earn
more profit and energy from the grid. Figure 5 displays the security policy that
expresses this security property. Since SMG is the only trusted process, we spec-
ify a filter function fexcess on the edges from the SMG to each of the prosumers.
Two auxiliary functions are needed for formally describing this filter func-
tion. First, given a finite sequence of actions α = a1 , . . . , am , for n ≤ m , let
suffix (α, n) denote the suffix of size n of α, which is compound of the last n
actions of α:
suffix (α, n) = am−n+1 , . . . , am .
Second, given a finite sequence of actions α and an action a, the function |α|a
returns the number of occurrences of action a in α. The global production Prod
13
is just the sum of the production plans of the individual prosumers:
Prod =
n∑
i=1
prodi
Using these auxiliary functions, the filter function fexcess is defined as follows:
fexcess(αa) = (
a = P(price) ∧ (α = ǫ ∨ suffix(α, 1) = E(0))
)
∨ (1)
(
a = E (excess) ∧
n∧
i=1
|suffix(α, i)|Plan(prodi )=1
∧ excess = compute excess(Prod)
)
(2)
Part (1) states that any P action is either the initial action of the SMG or
it follows the emission of the message indicating that the production plans do
not exceed the line capacity bounds. Part (2) requires that whenever action E
occurs, each prosumer has sent its production plan exactly once in the last n
actions of the sequence α and the filter function sends the correct excess value
compute excess(Prod), defined as:
compute excess(Prod) =


0, if LB ≤ Prod ≤ UB ,
Prod −UB , if UB < Prod ,
Prod − LB , otherwise.
The first condition holds whenever the global production does not exceed the
line capacity bounds LB and UB . The second case describes the case when
prosumers produce too much energy, and the third condition holds whenever
the global production exceeds the line capacity lower bound, in which case too
much energy is consumed.
The filter function fexcess ensures the security property that no prosumer
can deduce the production plan of any other prosumer. Indeed, a prosumer
only obtains one excess value after emitting one plan. This value depends on∑n
i=1 prodi and therefore, the prosumer Pri can obtain the value
∑
j 6=i prodj ,
provided it knows the bounds LB and UB . However, for n 6= 2, the prosumer
cannot deduce any information about the particular consumption of another
given prosumer, since the value of
∑
i 6=j prodi could have be obtained from any
other values prod ′i such that
∑
i 6=j prod
′
i =
∑
i 6=j prodi .
According to Theorem 1 and Proposition 1 it is sufficient to check that the
process SMG respects the filter function fexcess for proving that the overall sys-
tems enforces the security policy of Figure 5.
We are using model checking for automatically discharging this verification
condition based on an Uppaal model [3] of the smart microgrid and CTL en-
codings of the local verification condition for process SMG . Figure 6 displays
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Init
Price Sent
price = generate price();
!P(price);
Prod = 0
Collect Plans
price = 0 ¬received[Plani];
?Plani(prodi);
Prod+ = prodi;
received[Plani ] = true
Excess Sent
all plans received();
excess = compute excess(Prod);
!E(excess)
excess 6= 0;
reset received();
Prod = 0
excess = 0
reset received();
Figure 6: Implementation of the SMG
the automaton of the SMG process. The local states of this automaton are
pairs of locations and valuations of variables. Deadlines for the time the SMG
waits for prosumer plans to arrive could be added to the Uppaal model in a
straightforward way.
The SMG automaton in Figure 6 has Init as the initial location and a tran-
sition on which the energy price is generated and sent to prosumers, Price Sent
is reached after the price is sent to prosumers and after which we reset the value
of the energy price, and Collect Plans is active for the period when plans are
collected. Channel Plani is binary, meaning that each prosumer sends its pro-
duction plan on a unique channel. Guard ¬received [Plani ] guarantees that the
SMG takes into account the first production plan each prosumer sends. Here
received is an array of booleans that records which prosumers have already
sent their plans. When a prosumer tries to send a new plan before receiving
an E action, the SMG simply ignores this action. Local variable Prod adds
up the plans received. When the SMG has received a plan from each pro-
sumer (i.e. function all plans received returns true), the transition to location
Excess Sent is taken. On this transition, the excess is computed using function
compute excess and sent to prosumers. When the excess is not zero, the tran-
sition between Excess Sent and Collect Plans is taken which makes the SMG
ready to receive adjusted production plans. Finally, in case the excess is zero,
the transition to Init is taken. In both cases, the array of boolean indicating
which plans have been received is reset through the reset received() function.
In order to check that the SMG respects the filter function, one simply needs
to check:
∀α ∈ LocalExec(SMG),∀Pri ∈ {Pr1 , . . . ,Prn} :
¬f (αa) =⇒ a /∈ AinPri ∨ stepSMG(s
0
SMG .α, a) = undef .
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That is, for every sequence of actions α and an action a that falsifies the filter
function, either the action a is not transmitted to the prosumers or the action
a is not possible in the state reached after executing α. By contraposition, we
have to check that if the action a is an input for the prosumer and it can be
executed after α, then the filter function evaluates to true. Formally:
a ∈ AinPri ∧ stepSMG(s
0
SMG.α, a) 6= undef =⇒ f(αa)
In our case, the messages that can be sent to a prosumer are E(excess) and
P(price).
• We show that when action P(price) is sent, then Part (1) of the filter
function is satisfied. When action P is fired, either a) no other action has
occurred in process SMG or b) the production plans do not exceed the
line capacity bounds. In the former case, all the variables are initialized to
default values, meaning that excess is initialized to zero. The latter case
implies the same, i.e. location Price Sent , from where action P(price) is
sent, is reached only when excess is zero. These allows us to write the
following formula:
AG(Price Sent =⇒ (excess = 0)),
where Price Sent is the location reached immediately after action P(price)
is sent.
• We show that when E (excess) is sent, then Part (2) of the filter function is
satisfied. First, location EXCESS SENT is reached whenever the excess
action has been sent. Whenever the excess is computed, we can easily see
in the model of SMG that the Prod variable counts the first plan received
from each prosumer(guard ¬received [Plani ]), but each prosumer has sent
a plan (guard all plans received). Therefore the second part of the fil-
ter function, which requires that global production plan includes a single
plan received from each prosumer, is encoded in the model and there is
no need to formally verify it. It remains to reason about the value of the
excess function transmitted to prosumers. The following property checks
the value of the excess sent on the E action:
AG(EXCESS SENT =⇒ ((excess = 0 ∧ Prod ≤ UB ∧ Prod ≥ LB )∨
(excess = Prod −UB ∧ Prod > UB)∨
(excess = Prod − LB ∧ Prod < LB ))).
The Uppaal model built1 is parametrized with the number of prosumers.
Therefore, we have easily analyzed different configurations for prosumers. The
verification is fast e.g. a configuration with 100 prosumers verified in less than
1The model is available upon request.
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1 second. The Uppaal version used is 4.1.14 (64-bit), run on a Macbook Pro
with 8GB of memory.
In summary, we demonstrated how a security policy with filter function can
be defined for ensuring the security of a smart microgrid system. Moreover, we
have shown a transformation of the verification condition for the trusted SMG
component and its associated filter function into a CTL property, which can
readily be checked using standard model checking techniques.
5 Related Works
The notion of security policy, non-interference and the purge function goes back
to the seminal work of Goguen and Meseguer [8]. A purged sequence is a valid
execution sequence for the global model, and non-interference establishes that
a security domain is not able to distinguish between the execution of the orig-
inal or the purged sequence. In contrast, our purged sequences are not valid
executions of the global system in that they contain only actions directly visi-
ble by a process, and corresponding security properties state that two security
domains should not distinguish two executions that have the same purged se-
quence. Our developments also build on the notion of unwinding relations [9]
and Rushby’s unwinding theorem [15], which we generalize to security policies
with filter functions.
An intransitive non-interference security policy assumes that all informa-
tion available to a security domain is possibly transmitted whenever an action
of the domain is executed (Van der Meyden [13], Rushby [15]). Chong and
van der Meyden [5] extend this framework to filter functions in order to limit
the information transmitted about the history. This requires variations on the
purge function depending on the notion of security used. Since a sequence of
receive and send messages fully determines the state of the distributed system,
the original purge function is sufficient in our case.
Mantel [12] and Balliu [2] consider systems defined by a given set of execu-
tion traces. In these systems, a given action is not always possible in contrast to
Van der Meyden [13] and Rushby’s [15] setting. Mantel’s [12] development work
for transitiv security policies, whereas our work focuses on intransitive policies.
Balliu [2] considers distributed systems for which the confidentiality of chan-
nels between processes needs to be ensured. The condition for security is based
on knowledge with perfect recall; low security components should not be able
to infer the content of a high security channel based on the history of observa-
tion on the low security channels. In the Starlight example, if the user always
requests each command once in high security mode and once in low security
mode, the low security network knows all executed high security commands.
Here, we are considering such an implementation is to be secure, since the filter
function is respected, but it is insecure in Balliu’s [2] framework. This requires,
however, to exactly know the set of traces of the system, and thus the concrete
implementation of every process. In other words, such properties need to be
checked on the global model, whereas we reduce the checking of global security
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policies to verification conditions on single security domains. It seems to be in-
teresting to investigate which knowledge-based security properties can actually
be encoded in terms of security policies.
Zhang [16] describes filter functions in terms of regular expressions, and
proves a result comparable to Theorem 1. Furthermore, intransitive security
policies are encoded through filter functions. Zhang [16] framework, however,
does not cover the case of distributed systems consisting of processes commu-
nicating through messages, where each process constitutes a separate security
domain. Thus, checking that the system respects a filter function needs to be
done globally, whereas we check each filter function against a single process.
6 Conclusions and future work
Our main results reduces compliance proofs of distributed system with intran-
sitive security policies, possibly strengthened by filter functions, to localized
verification conditions for each filter function. These localized conditions only
require proving that source processes filter function obey their filter functions.
In this way, security proofs for distributed systems are decomposed into local-
ized verification conditions. Our work is motivated by the development of a
distributed separation kernel in the D-MILS project, which allows us to deploy
security policies on a distributed computing platform.
We have applied our techniques to a non-trivial case study involving a
prosumer-based smart microgrid, and applied CTL model checking for automat-
ically checking the localized verification conditions. It would be interesting to
enrich filter functions with further information about grid stability, optimization
of energy consumption[4], or timing constraints[6]. For the smart microgrid case
study we have manually derived the CTL verification conditions, but it should
be possible to automatically generate these temporal logic formulas from the
definition of filter functions. It also seems to be worthwhile to investigate how
filter functions may be extracted automatically from formally defined security
properties.
Further work towards applying our framework to the development and de-
ployment of real-world security applications include the extension of filter func-
tions with cryptographic information, in particular, using the symbolic approach
Dolev-Yao model [7]. Moreover, sequential dependencies between filter functions
may also need to be considered. Because of the localized verification conditions
for demonstrating security it is conceivable to provide for incremental security
proofs in a setting with dynamically changing security policies and distributed
systems.
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